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STATE TAXATION OF NATIONAL BANK STOCKS:
UNCERTAINTY OF ITS CONSTIUTIONAL BASIS
By ALFRED J. SCHWEPPE*
T has been constantly assumed in modern decisions concerning
the power of the states to levy a tax on national bank stock, that
such power of the states rests solely on the permissive legislation
of Congress.1
It is the purpose of this discussion to raise two
questions: (1)
whether this assumption it warranted by the
early decisions upon which it purports to be based; and (2)
*President of the Student Board of Editors of the MINNESOTA LAW
REviEw.
'People v. Weaver, (1879) IOO U. S. 539, 543, 25 L. Ed. 705: "That
the provision which we have cited was necessary to authorize the states to
impose any tax whatsoever on these bank shares is abundantly established
by the cases of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. Bank
of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, and Weston v. City of Charleston, 2 Pet.
449.
"As Congress was conferring a power
on the states which they
would not otherwise have had. . .
Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, (1898) 173 U. S. 664, 668, ig
S. C. R. 537, 43 L. Ed. 85o: "It follows then necessarily from these conclusions that the respective states would be wholly without power to levy
a tax, either direct -or indirect, upon the national banks, their property,
assets or franchises, were it not for the permissive legislation of Congress."
Bank of California v. Richardson, (1919) 248 U. S. 476, 483, 39 S. C.
R. 165, 63 L. Ed. 372, following a full discussion of the congressional
intent in passing section S219 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States: "Full and express power on that subject was given accompanied
by a limitation preventing the exercise in a discriminatory manner, a
power which from its very limitation was exclusive of other methods
of taxation and left, therefore, no room for taxation of the federal
agency or its instrumentalities or essential accessories except as recognized
by the provision in question."
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., (1921) 255 U. S. 18o, 41 S.
C. R. 243, 65 L. Ed. 36o: "The same principle has been recognized in the
Bank Tax Cases, declaring the power of the states to tax the property
and franchises of national banks only to the extent of the laws authorized
by Congress. Owensboro Nat. Bank. v. Owensboro, (I898), 173 U. S.
664, rg S. C. R. 537, 43 L. Ed. 85o, involved the validity of a franchise
tax in Kentucky on national banks. In that case this court declared . . .
that the states were wholly without power to levy any tax directly or
indirectly upon national banks, their property, assets or franchises, except so far as the permissive legislation allowed such taxation."
See also note 18.
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whether, assuming that a state has no such power under the constitution, Congress has the power to grant such permission.
Although the cases of McCulloch 7).Maryland,' Osborne v.
Bank of the United States,' and Weston v. City of Charleston'
are frequently referred to as denying the power of the states to
levy such a tax,' it seems clear that Chief Justice Marshall, who
rendered those decisions, admitted the power of the states to tax
national bank stock as distinguished from a tax upon the corporation, its capital, its operations, and the federal securities held by
them. In McCulloch v. Maryland he said:
"This opinion does not deprive the states of any of the resources
which they originally possessed. It does not extend to a tax paid
by the real property of the bank, in common with the other real
property within the state, nor to a tax imposed on the interest
which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in
common with other property of the same description throughout
the state. But this is a tax on the operations of the bank and is,
consequently, a tax on the operation of an instrument employed
by the government of the Union to carry its powers into execution. Such a tax must be unconstitutional."'
That in excepting from the scope of the decision "the interest
which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution" Marshall expressly had in mind the power of the state to tax national
bank stock seems clear not only from a careful reading of the
language, but also because the exception was made with direct
reference to, and the language of it in part adopted from, the
argument of Mr. Pinkney, who, while contending that the state
had no power to tax the bank itself, conceded that the state could
tax the stock of the United States Bank in the hands of individual
citizens.' Almost simultaneously with the decision of McCulloch
v. Maryland, the South Carolina court decided that though the
state could not tax the bank as such, it could tax United States
'(1819) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
'(1824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 738, 6 L. Ed. 204.
'(1829) 2 Pet. (U. S.) 449, 7 L. Ed. 481.
'See note i.
'(1819) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 436, 4 L. Ed. 579.
'(1819) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 396-397, 4 L. Ed. 579: "It is objected,
however, that the act of Congress, incorporating the bank, withdraws
property from taxation by the state, which would otherwise be liable to
state taxation. We answer, that it is immaterial, if it does thus withdraw
certain property from the grasp of state taxation, if Congress had authority to establish the bank, since the power of Congress is supreme. But,
in fact, it withdraws nothing from the mass of taxable property in Maryland, which the state could tax. The whole capital of the bank belonging
to private stockholders, is drawn from every state in the Union, and
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BAnk stock held by an individual.' This South Carolina case was
cited to the Supreme Court in Weston v. City of Charleston,' and
not discussed. Chief Justice Marshall, however, in the latter
case ' reaffirmed the exceptions made in McCulloch v. Maryland,
the second of which in modern decisions has been ignored or has
dropped out of sight. That Marshall and his contemporaries regarded the states as having power under the constitution to tax
national bank stock, as distinguished from the bank itself, also
appears from the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Thompson in
Weston v. City of Charleston." This view that the states had the
power to tax, and that the congressional statute was declaratory
merely of an existing state power of taxation subsisted as late as
1865.
Up to that time then it may be safely said that the second
exception in McCulloch v. Maryland was believed to recognize the
constitutional power of the states to tax national bank stock.
The second stage of the history of this doctrine is revealed
the stock belonging to the United States previously constituted a -part of
the public treasure. Neither the stock belonging to citizens of other
states, nor the privileged treasure of the United States mixed up with
this private property were previously liable to taxation in Maryland;
and as to the stock belonging to its own citizens, it still continues liable
to state taxation, as a portion of their individual property, in common
with all other private property in the state."
The italics are ours. A comparison of the italicised words with
Marshall's reveals a striking similarity. It should be noted, moreover, that
both of those eminent men had doubts about the taxability of bank stock
belonging to non-residents.
'Bulow & Potter v. City of Charleston, (I819) i Nott & McCord
(S. C.) 521. To the same effect, see State ex rel. Berney v. Tax Collector,
(1831) 2 Bailey (S. C.) 654, 672, 678-679, 684, 686; see also First Nat.
Bank v. Peterborough, (1875) 56 N. H. 38.
'(1829) 2 Pet. (U. S.) 449, 461, 7 L. Ed. 481.
0(1829) 2 Pet. (U. S.) 449, 469, 7 L. Ed. 481: "It has been supposed
that a tax on stock [United States bonds] comes within the exceptions
stated in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland. We do not think so."
'(1829) 2 Pet. (U. S.) 449, 479, 7 L. Ed. 481: "The broad proposition
laid down in McCulloch v. Maryland that the states cannot tax any instrument of the general government in the execution of its powers, must
be understood as referring to a direct tax upon such means or instrument; and that such was the understanding of the court is to be inferred
from the exemption of bank stock from the general rule." The italics
are ours.
' 2Van Allen v. Assessors, (1865) 3 Wall. (U. S.) 573, i8 L. Ed. 229.
Chief Justice Chase said in the course of the dissenting opinion at p. 595,
after quoting the exceptions in McCulloch v. Maryland: "With these
principles and this exception in view, Congress, in order that nothing
might be left to inference, expressly authorized state.taxation, of the real
estate held by national banking associations, and of the interest of private
citizens in them. This was done by the three provisos to the 41st section.
• .. [tax on shares]." And at p. 597: "We think this is the plain
sense of these provisos [section 5219]. They adopt the exception ad-
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in the leading case of Van Allen v. Assessors," where the majority
of the court recognized the original power of the states to tax
national bank stock, but ruled that Congress through the doctrine
of concurrent power had the right by statute to limit the power
of the states in that regard." The minority of the court agreed
to that view, but dissented on another point."
mitted by Chief Justice Marshall to the rule of exemption in McCulloch

v. Maryland. They subject the interest held by citizens in national banking associations to a tax in common with other property of the same description, and they give to the exception a practical application by determining what property is of the same description with the interest to be
taxed in common with it." The italics are ours. These expositions of
the statute were by the way merely, and not called in question by the
majority of the court.
"(1865) 3 Wall. (U. S.) 573, I8 L. Ed. 229.
"(1865) 3 Wall. (U. S.) 573, 585. 18 L. Ed. 229: "It is said that
Congress possesses no power to confer upon a state authority to be
exercised which has been exclusively delegated to that body by the constitution, and consequently, that it cannot confer the right of taxation;
nor is a state competent to receive a grant of any such power of Congress. We agree to this. But as it respects a subject-matter over which
Congress and the states may exercise a concurrent power, but from the
exercise of which Congress, by reason of its paramount authority, may
exclude the states, there is no doubt Congress may withold the exercise
of that authority and leave the states free to act. . . . The power of
taxation under the constitution as a general rule, and as has been repeatedly recognized in adjudged cases in this court, is a concurrent
power. The qualifications of this rule are the exclusion from the taxation of the means and instruments employed in the exercise of the functions of the federal government.
"The remaining question is, has Congress legislated in respect to
these associations, so as to leave the shares of the stockholders subject
to state taxation." And at p. 584: "Now it is this interest which the act
of Congress has left subject to taxation by the states, under the limitations prescribed. . ....
It should be expressly noted here that the opinion does not regard
bank stock as "means and instruments employed in the exercise of functions of the federal government," from the taxation of which the states
are absolutely excluded, but as an object falling under the concurrent
taxing power of the states and Congress. That is, this case openly
recognizes that bank stock does not fall under the inhibition of the early
cases on the subject.
See also Adams v. Nashville, (1877) 95 U. S. 19, 22, 24 L. Ed. 369:
"The plain intention of the statute [section 52191 was to protect the
corporations formed under its authority from unfriendly discrimination
by the states in the exercise of their taxing power." And see Bank of
California v. Richardson, (1919) 248 U. S. 476, 482, 39 S. C. R. 165, 63
L. Ed. 372, where Chief Justice White says: "The forms of expression
used in the section make it certain that in adopting it the legislative mind
had in view the subject of how far the banking associations created were
or should be made subject to state taxation, which presumably it was
deemed necessary to deal with in view of the controversies growing out
of the creation of the bank of the United States and dealt with by decisions of this court." Citing the McCulloch, the Osborn, and the Weston
,cases.
'See note 12. The minority dissented on the ground that a tax on
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The third stage of the doctrine begins in the assumptions made
in People v. Weaver' and Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro," where it is said, apparently in interpretation of the early
decisions of the court, that the states had no power at all to tax
national bank stock, except by virtue of the congressional per.mission conferred by section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States."
Oddly enough, because of these assumptions, the question
whether a state can tax national bank stock apart from the congressional restriction, has never been expressly decided by the
Supreme Court as a constitutional question unless the Van Allen
case be so regarded and its reasoning accepted." The early cases
merely decided that under the constitution a state cannot tax
national bank notes," the right of a branch Bank of the United
States to do business," and United States stocks [bonds] .= These
cases go no further than to hold that a state cannot directly tax
a national bank or federal securities, and do not extend to bank
stock. Moreover, the reasoning of these cases which, it has been
assumed, covers national bank stock must be regarded as limited
by the second exception made in McCulloch v. Maryland. And
the bank stock was, in effect, a tax on the government securities held
by the bank and therefore void under the early cases. The majority held
that the stock might be taxed although the whole of the bank capital was
invested in government securities, because of the separate entity of the
corporation and its stockholders.
"dSee note I.
"'See note i.

"See note i. And see to the same effect Mercantile Bank v. New
York, (1886) 121 U. S. 138, 154, 7 S. C. R. 826, 30 L. Ed. 895: "Neither
the banks themselves, nor their capital, however invested, nor the shares
of stock held by individual citizens could be taxed by the states in which
they were located without the consent of Congress, being exempted from
the power of the states in this respect, because these banks were means
and agencies established by Congress in execution of the powers of the
government of the United States. It was deemed consistent, however,
with these national uses, and otherwise expedient to grant to the states
the authority to tax them within the limits of a rule prescribed by law."
"The majority of the court held in Van Allen v. Assessors, (0865)
3 Wall. (U. S.) 573, 18 L. Ed. 229, that the act of Congress, rightly construed, subjected national bank shares to state taxation, even though the
whole of the banking capital was invested in national securities, and that
the act so construed was constitutional. The constitutional questions
were but casually considered, and the reasoning in support of constitutionality has apparently long since been forgotten and departed from.
"McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
"Osborn v. Bank of the United States, (1924) 9 Wheat. (U. S.)
738, 6 L. Ed. 204.

'Weston v. City of Charleston, (1829) 2 Pet. (U. S.) 449, 7 L. Ed.
481.
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when added to this is the holding in Van Allen v. Assessors that
the shares of the stockholders are separate and distinct from the
property of the bank, and that while a tax cannot be constitutionally levied on the bank itself, a tax may nevertheless be levied on
the shares because it is not a tax on the bank," there is perhaps
some room for believing that the Supreme Court, on squarely
facing the constitutional question," may revert to the opinion entertained by Marshall and his contemporaries, that in regard to
2(1865) 3 Wall. (U. S.) 573, 584, 18 L. Ed. 229: "This (the shareholder's] is a distinct independent interest or property, held by the shareholder like any other property that may belong to him. Now, it is this
interest which the act of Congress has left subject to taxation by the
states, under the limitations prescribed....
This doctrine has since been many times reasserted. See Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owensboro, (1898)

173 U. S. 664, 681, 19 S. C. R. 537,

43 L. Ed. 85o, where it is said: "It cannot be doubted that as a general
principle it is settled that taxation of the property, franchises, and right
of a corporation is one thing, and the taxation of the shares of stock in
the names of the stockholders is another and different one." See to
the same effect Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, (907) 205 U. S.
503, 27 S. C. R. 571, 51 L. Ed. goi; Bulow & Potter v. City of Charleston,
(18ig) I Nott & McCord (S. C.) 527; see, however, Bank of California
v. Richardson, (1919) 248 U. S.476, 485, 39 S. C. R. 165, 63 L. Ed. 372,
where it is said (three justices dissenting) : "But it is undoubted that the
statute for the purpose of preserving the state power of taxation, considering the subject from the point of view of ultimate beneficial interest,
treated the stock interest, that is, the stockholder, and the bank as one,
and subject to one taxation by the methods which it provided." That such
a view of the identity of the corporation and the stockholder is erroneous
and unnecessary to the decision, which might have been rested on the
exclusiveness of the statute alone, see the dissenting opinion of Mr. justice Pitney in the same case. And see Eisner v. McComber, (1920) 252
U. S. 189, 213-214, 40 S. C. R. 189, 64 L. Ed.

521,

where the doctrine of

separate entity of -acorporation from the stockholders was reasserted by
the court.
"It is true that the argument here suggested was referred to in the
-dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Chase in Van Allen v. Assessors,
(1865) 3 Wall. (U. S.) 573, 592-593, 18 L. Ed. 229, as follows: "But it
was urged in the argument that though the capital of a bank, so far as
it consists of national

securities, is exempt from state taxation, the

shares of that capital may be taxed without reference to the legislation
of Congress, and without regard to the national securities which they
rep resent. . . .
"We do not understand the majority of the court as asserting that
shares of capital invested in national securities could be taxed without
authority of Congress. We certainly cannot yield our assent to such a
proposition."
But it must be borne in mind that the reason for the dissent was that
a tax on the bank stock was an indirect'tax on the bonds, a view expressly
denied by the majority of the court. The reason for the dissent appears
more fully on p. 596, where the court, admitting that the early cases never

passed upon state taxation of national bank stock, asserts that Marshall
"would have detected taxation of bonds under the disguise of taxation
of the capital or shares of capital, in which they were invested."
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national bank stock MrCulloch v. Maryland "does not deprive
the states of any resources which they originally possessed."'
States whose taxing programs have been endangered by the recent
decisions of Merchants' National Bank v. Richmond' and Eddy
v. First National Bank of Fargo= will have an opportunity of
asking the court to determine the power of the states in this
matter under the federal constitution.
The second question is this: assuming that the Supreme
Court will hold that the state does not have an original power
under the constitution to tax national bank stock, whence does
Congress derive its authority to give the states permission to do
so? In Van Allen v. Assessors it was said that Congress and
the states possess a concurrent power to tax national bank stock,
but that Congress has the right to restrict the exercise of state
power in that regard,' and that therefore section 5219 was within
the legislative province of Congress. This view seems to overlook the doctrine of Gibbons v. Ogdenr that the taxing power of
Congress and the taxing power of the states are separate and
distinct, and sovereign in their own sphere. That is, they are not
'See text for note 6.
41 S. C. R. 619; see for full discussion of the case 6 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 56.
(C.C. A., eighth circuit, 1921) 275 Fed. 550. For a discussion of
this case, see in this issue RECENT CASES, p. 239.
'
See note 14.
'(*(824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.) z, i99, 6 L. Ed. 23: "Congress is authorized
to lay and. collect taxes, etc., to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. This does not
interfere with the power of the states to tax for the support of their own
governments; nor is the exercise of that power by the states an exercise
of any portion of the power that is granted to the United States. In imposing taxes for state purposes, they are not doing what Congress is empowered to do. Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes
which are within the exclusive province of the states. When, then, each
government exercises the power of taxation, neither is exercising the
power of the other." And at p. 201: "But the power to levy taxes could
never be considered as abridging the right of the states on that subject."
See to the same effect Lane County v. Oregon, (1868) 7 Wall. (U. S.) 71,
76-78, 19 L. Ed. 67, where the doctrine of concurrency of the taxing power
is construed to mean two co-existing independent powers, except that "in
case of a tax on the same subject by both governments, the claim of the
United States, as the supreme authority, is to be preferred; but with this
qualification it [the state taxing power) is absolute. . . . There is
nothing in the constitution which contemplates or authorizes any abridgment of this power by national legislation." See also Passenger Cases,
(1849) 7 How. (U. S.) 282, 298-299. That the expression "the claim of
the United States is to be preferred" does not mean that Congress may
restrict existing state power, but that the federal claim may be first collected, see 26 R. C. L. io8; ii Encyc. of U. S. Reports 389.
'(192I)
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concurrent except perhaps in the sense of being coexistent; they
are not one power exercised by both, but two powers exercised
separately, and each within its proper bounds is not under the
control of the other.' Just why Congress then can undertake to
restrict the power of the states to tax an article which Marshall
conceded to be within the sphere of state power is not clear. If
the xiew of Mr. Justice Nelson in the Van Allen case is correct,
to-wit, that the taxing power, at least in regard to bank stock, is
"a concurrent power" exercisable by both the states and Congress,
"but from the exercise of which Congress, by reason of its paramount authority, may exclude the states," it is not perceived why
the same definition of concurrency does not apply to the taxing
power in general, nor what limit is fixed on the excluding or restricting power of Congress, nor what becomes of the division between state and federal taxing power made by Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, where the meaning of the word concurrent was
discussed by counsel and court at great length.'
Moreover, the change of view taken in People v. Weaver,'
that rather than being a restriction of existing state power, section 5219 was a delegation of power by Congress to the states,
"which they would not otherwise have had" is answered by the
reasoning of Mr. Justice Nelson in Van Allen v. AssessorsY In
Home Saving Bank v. Des Moines it is said: "It may well be
doubted whether Congress has the power to confer upon the
state the right to tax obligations of the United States." Since
the power to delegate to the states the right to tax shares of national bank stock, provided that the court should find that the
states have no original power in spite of McCulloch v. Maryland
and Van Allen v. Assessors, must rest upon the same basis as the
power to confer the right to tax obligations of the United States,
the court is faced with the duty of determining whether such
power can be delegated at all, and whether the answer of Mr. justice Nelson" is not conclusive upon the question.
"See note 29.
"See note 29, and for arguments of counsel on the point see Gibbons

v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.) I, 42, 88, et passim, 6 L. Ed. 23.
"See note i.
'See first half of quotation in note 14; see also Gibbons v. Ogden,
(1824)

9 Wheat.

(U. S.) I, 2o7, 6 L. Ed. 23, .Marshall, C. J., speaking:

"Although Congress cannot enable a state to legislate, Congress may
adopt the provisions of a state on any subject."
3' (i9o7) 205 U. S. 503, 27 S. C. R. 571, 51 L. Ed. goi.
"See first half of quotation in note 14.
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If the states have no original power to tax national bank
shares, and if Congress has no authority to delegate such power,
the shares can never be subjected to state taxation except by constitutional amendment; and state banks, unless their shares are
also exempted from taxation, will soon find that their taxable
'In Van Allen v. Assessors, (1865) 3 Wall. (U. S.) 573, 583, i8 L.
Ed. 229, Mr. Justice Nelson, in meeting the argument advanced by counsel and supported by the minority of the court, says: "Were we to admit,
for the sake of argument, this to be tax of the bonds or capital stock of
the bank, it is but a tax upon the new uses and privileges conferred by the
charter of the association; it is but a condition annexed to the enjoyment of this new use and new application of the bonds; and if Congress
possessed the power to grant these new rights and privileges, which none
of learned counsel denies, and which the whole argument assumes, then
we do not see but the power to annex the conditions is equally clear and
indisputable.

.

.

. The tax is the condition for the new rights and

privileges conferred upon these associations." And in Clark Distilling
Company v. Western Maryland Ry., (1917) 242 U. S. 311, 326, 37 S. C. R.
iSo, 61 L. Ed. 326, Mr. Chief Justice White, speaking for the court, says:
"The argument as to delegation of power to the states rests upon a misconception. It is true that the regulation which the Webb-Kenyon Act
contains permits state prohibitions to apply to movements of liquor from
one state to another, but the will which causes the prohibitions to be applicable is that of Congress, since the application of state prohibitions
would cease the instant the act of Congress ceased to apply."
In the first of these excerpts the court argues that, assuming national
bank stock and federal securities to be in the same class, the taxing
power of the state is permitted to operate as a condition precedent to the
right of the banking corporations to do business. In the second excerpt
the contention of the court is that while Congress does not confer any
power upon the states, it so acts as to strip intoxicating liquor of its immunity from the operation of state laws. What difference there is between making the operation of state power a condition precedent, and a
recognition of power in the states; and what difference there is between
stripping an article of its constitutional immunity from the operation of
state laws and a delegation of power to the states to act in regard to that
subject-matter, is not perceived. If in substance the act of Congress
amounts to a delegation of power, the questions still remain whether
Congress may constitutionally affix a condition that amounts to a delegation of power to the states, and whether Congress may strip of an immunity when it amounts to a delegation of power. Would such a condition
and such a removal of immunity, involving a delegation of power, be constitutional? See discussion of this phase of the Clark Distilling case in
an article by Noel T. Dowling and F. Morse Hubbard, entitled Divesting
an Article of its Interstate Character, 5 MINNESOTA LAw RFviEw 1oo, especially at pp. 114-116.

A caution should here be observed not to misconceive the language
of Marshall C. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden at p. 202, where he says: "'A duty
on tonnage,' is as much a tax, as a duty on imports or exports; and the
reason which induced the prohibition of those taxes, extends. to this also.
This tax may be imposed by a state with the consent of Congress; and
it may be admitted that Congress cannot give a right to a state in virtue
of its own powers." Congress is expressly authorized by the constitution,
art. i, see. io,clause 3, to consent to such a tax; and it does not follow
that Congress can consent to any dther tax, where such consent is not
authorized by the constitution. As a matter of fact it would seem a

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

shares, as compared to the tax-exempt shares of national bank
stock, will go begging for want of purchasers. The only manner
in which the present congressional legislation, or any future congressional legislation with whatever retroactive clauses" may be
appended thereto, is sustainable seems to be adopting the reasoning in Van Allen v. Assessors, that the taxing power under the
constitution is a concurrent power, with authority in Congress to
restrict the exercise of state power. If that be true, the Supreme
Court will be obliged to define anew what is the meaning of the
word concurrent' as applied to the taxing power.
The conclusions to be drawn from this discusgion are: (1)
that beginning with Marshall's time the Supreme Court has regarded the states as having, at first, full constitutional power to
tax national bank stock, later, a power restrictable by Congress
because of the concurrent nature of the taxing power, and finally,
no power at all except such as has been delegated by Congress;
(2) that the extent of the original power of the states to tax
national bank stock has never been expressly decided, unless the
Van Allen case be so regarded and its reasoning accepted; and
(3) that the basis of the right by which the states to-day assume
to tax national bank stock is not clear, the Supreme Court having
shifted" its ground from considering it to be a restriction of
existing state power, on the one hand, to a delegation of congressional power, on the other, the constitutional basis of both of
which is involved in much uncertainty. It would seem that the
time is ripe for a thorough reconsideration of all the leading cases
on the important constitutional questions of the state power to
reasonable interpretation, that since the constitution has expressly defined
those instances in which Congress can consent to state taxation, that
Congress cannot consent in any other case. See Noel T. Dowling and F.
Morse Hubbard, Divesting an Article of its Interstate Character, 5 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW zoo, at pp. 116-117.
"In 6 MINNESoTA LAW REVIEW 56, at p. 58, the advisability of a retroactive clause is suggested. This suggestion seems to have been adopted
by the Minnesota State Tax Commission and at its recommendation incorporated in a bill now pending before Congress.
"It is significant that the word concurrent appears nowhere in the
federal constitution except in the nineteenth amendment, and that the
meaning of the word, although often used in the Supreme Court cases,
does not seem to have a clearly defined meaning.

"It should be pointed out here that the Court has shifted only in its
language concerning the constitutional question; and that in regard to
the interpretation of the phrase that state taxation "shall not be at a

greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of
individual citizens," the Supreme Court in a long line of decisions has
not deviated. See 6 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 56.
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tax' and the congressional power to restrict or delegate,' so that
the doubt arising from the variances in the cases up to the present
time may be set at rest.
"McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 4 L. Ed.
579; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, (1824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 738,

6 L. Ed. 204; Weston v. City of Charleston, (1829)

2 Pet. (U. S.) 449,

7 L. Ed. 481; Van Allen v. Assessors, (1865) 3 Wall. (U. S.) 573, 18 L.
Ed. 229.
"Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) i, 4 L. Ed. 499; Lane
County v. Oregon, (1868) 7 Wall. (U. S.) 71, i9 L. Ed. 67; Van Allen v.
Assessors, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 573, i8 L. Ed. 229; People v. Weaver, (1869)
100 U. S. 539, 25 L. Ed. 705; Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owensboro, (i898)
173 U. S. 664, ig S. C. R. 537, 43 L. Ed. 850; Bank of California v.
Richardson, (1919) 248 U. S. 476, 39 S. C. R. i65, 63 L. Ed. 372; Clark
Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., (1917) 242 U. S. 311, 37 S. C. R.
i8o, 61 L. Ed. 326.

